INTRODUCTION
The Department has responded to the recommendation with a rewrite of the 1982 guide that concentrates on the management aspects, and organizational structures needed. The primary objective of Defense acquisition is to acquire quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission capability and operational support in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable price [1] . This new guide addresses reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) as they support that objective. It focuses on what can be done to achieve satisfactory levels of RAM and how to assess RAM. This article introduces the new RAM guide: what it is, why it is important, the current RAM problems in the Department of Defense (DoD), and the activities appropriate to achieving satisfactory levels.
Many factors are important to RAM: system design; manufacturing quality; the environment in which the system is transported, handled, stored, and operated; the effectiveness of the support system; the level of training and skills of the people operating and maintaining the system; and the diagnostic aids and tools (instrumentation) available to them. The guide is built around the following beliefs: during presystems acquisition, the most important activity is to understand the users' needs and constraints. During system development, the most important RAM activity is to identify potential failure mechanisms and to make design changes to remove them. During production, is the most important RAM activity is to ensure quality in manufacturing so that the inherent RAM qualities of the design are not degraded. Finally, in operations and support, the most important RAM activity is to monitor performance in order to facilitate retention of RAM capability, to enable improvements in design (e.g., a new design spiral), or of the support system .
The Current RAM Problem with Military Systems.
Although significant improvements have been made in increasing the reliability of basic components such as microelectronics, these have not always been accompanied by corresponding gains in the reliability of equipment or systems. While the speed, range, firepower, and overall mission performance of weapons systems has improved dramatically over the years, RAM problems have persisted. RAM problems slow the development and fielding of systems, drive up the total ownership cost, and degrade operational readiness and mission accomplishment at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. RAM is important because it affects readiness, mission success, total ownership cost, and logistics footprint.
A number of studies and reports indicate that the problems are not limited to a few systems; they often arise in the initial definition of requirements; and they have a significant impact on the DoD budget. RAM data collection and analysis is part of the problem.
A study [1] of some defense systems provides an example of the breadth of the RAM problem (Figures 1-1 and 1-2 In both periods (1985-1990 and 1996-2000) , a large percentage of systems failed to meet needed levels of operational reliability. Further, the trend worsened. As a result, DoD conducted a series of studies on these programs to determine the causes. They concluded [2] that defense contractor reliability design practices may not be consistent with best commercial practices for accelerated testing, simulation guided testing, and process certification and control. Physics-of-failure approaches with physics-based computer-aided design tools may not have been used on a regular basis. Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and a Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) were rarely used. In addition, DoD found that inadequate testing was conducted at the component and system level. Testing time was limited and sample sizes were too small. Component stress testing was frequently inadequate or not conducted. Proper accelerated life testing was rarely accomplished. Early system-level modeling and simulation was inadequate to enter tests with acceptable levels of reliability.
A 2003 GAO analysis reported that persistent low readiness rates and costly maintenance problems contribute to increases in the total ownership cost of DoD systems [1] . The GAO report offered several reasons: 1) weapons system requirements focused on technical performance, with little attention to operations and support (O&S) costs and readiness, especially early in development; 2) using immature technologies to meet performance goals weakened the ability to design weapon systems with high reliability; and 3) limited collaboration among organizations charged with requirements setting, product development, and maintenance.
Another study, by the National Research Council, recommended improvements to data collection and analysis to confront RAM problems:
The Department of Defense and the military services should give increased attention to their reliability, availability, and maintainability data collection and analysis procedures because deficiencies continue to be responsible for many of the current field problems and concerns about military readiness. [1] In summary, these studies and the corporate experience of the DoD over the past decade suggest the following reasons why systems fail to achieve RAM requirements: a. Poorly defined or unrealistically high RAM requirements. b. Too little engineering for RAM. Among the engineering process failures, five stand out:
(1) Failure to design-in reliability early in the development process (2) Inadequate lower level testing at component or subcomponent level (3) Reliance on predictions instead of conducting engineering design analysis.
(4) Failure to perform engineering analyses of commercial off the shelf (COTS) equipment; and (5) Lack of reliability improvement incentives.
To address these problems the Department began an effort to revise the Guide. The emphasis would be, in this first volume, on the management and management structures, the tasks and the tools that should be used. The emphasis on management rather than detailed statistical technique was a response to the finding that simple cookbook formulae were no longer adequate, if they ever were, to the analytical needs. The guide to developing and fielding systems with satisfactory levels of RAM is based on systematically managing the elimination of failures and failure modes through identification, classification, analysis, and removal or mitigation. These activities start in pre-systems acquisition and continue through development, production, and beyond into operations and support. A multidisciplinary team users (operators and maintainers), system and design engineers, manufacturing engineers, and testers collaboratively develop a RAM rationale which establishes bounds on the trade space and guides the entire program. This analysis will likely require the use of modeling to ensure performance is achieved across the required scenarios. The analysis considers the interaction of many elements, e.g., system reliability with the logistic support concept (the support structure used to maintain and repair the system, the number of spares, and spare parts). User constraints on the number of people available to operate and maintain the system will affect availability of the fleet. Throughout the analysis, the probability of mission success should be a fundamental metric. Mission failure due to the system's failure to operate properly in its intended environment is a reliability failure as well as a mission failure. Since reliability is dependant on the environment, the reliability of commercial off-the-shelf items may differ significantly in the military application.
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• Compare the needed levels of RAM to the RAM performance of current systems/capabilities performing the mission. Assess the feasibility of achieving the needed levels of RAM with available technology. Initiate technology development and risk reduction efforts to achieve user RAM needs.
• Develop a Request for Proposal (RFP) that addresses all aspects of system performance. The RFP should clearly identify all constraints, assumptions, and definitions needed for the contractors to put the RAM situation in context, derive the inherent levels of RAM (those that are determined by design and manufacturing), and determine the best approach for achieving satisfactory RAM, and state the operational RAM requirements, e.g., operational availability. (See Appendix 1.1)
• Translate the operational RAM terms into suitable request for proposal (RFP) and contractual terms for the material development contractor to pursue. Develop the mission reliability specification, the logistics reliability needs and constraints, and the maintainability specification requirements. These and associated RAM program and acceptance test requirements become part of request for proposal and contract. Specification development requires conversion of the operational RAM parameters to an equivalent contractual measurement. This process has been recognized as a weak link. This step is considered in detail in Chapter 3. Contracting is discussed in the appendix to Chapter 3. It is important to understand and manage this potential problem.
• Provide Reliability and Maintainability Incentives in
Contracts. To achieve the levels of RAM the user needs, the program manager has to put requirements and incentives in the contract, pay for them, conduct program reviews, and provide effective oversight. Contract requirements and the vendor selection process must reflect explicitly the need for reliable systems. Contracts should provide clear incentives to design and build reliable, maintainable systems versus allowing significant profit from follow-on replenishment spares. Inadequately addressing this step is one of the primary reasons for test difficulties and failures to meet user needs. The definition should include specifying values for the appropriate RAM parameters.
STEP 2 DESIGN AND REDESIGN FOR RAM.
During this phase the key objectives are to: • Develop a comprehensive program for designing and manufacturing for RAM that includes people, reporting responsibility, and a reliability manager.
• Develop a conceptual system model, which consists of components, subsystems, manufacturing processes and performance requirements. Use the model throughout development to estimate performance and RAM metrics.
• Identify all critical failure modes and degradations and address them in design.
• Use data from component-level testing to characterize distribution of times to failure • Conduct sufficient analysis to meet RAM requirement • Design in: diagnostics for fault isolation and detection; modularity to facilitate remove-and-replace maintenance; accessibility; and other solutions to user-related needs such as embedded instrumentation and prognostics. To meet these objectives, Step 2, Design and Redesign for RAM, requires the following key activities: Conduct formal design reviews for reliability and maintainability. Conduct formal reviews for reliability that promote an understanding of the tactical operational environment in which the system or subsystem will operate. Formal reliability reviews should be conducted at least once each during preliminary design and during final design. These activities occur during the system development and demonstration (SDD) phase. Reliability reviews should begin early in the system development process and continue through
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production and deployment. Reliability reviews might even be appropriate during technology development [4] . These reviews assure that the reliability model, the current design configuration, and the engineering design agree.
An impartial, competent peer should perform the design review. The engineer who performs the RAM analyses is usually the judge of the attributes to be examined and their exact depth of examination. The analyst also selects the analytical approach. All of these decisions are a function of the analyst's experience, wisdom, and perception of the user needs and constraints. For these reasons it is very possible that omissions or inadvertent errors are occasionally made. Experience has shown that approximately 40 percent of all analyses contain significant shortcomings when performed for the first time [4] . Approximately half of these are defects or omissions in the analysis alone and are not design defects. The remaining 20 percent actually represent design defects, the severity of which ranges from minor to mission catastrophic. Experience has also shown that about 5 percent of all released manufacturing designs contain potential mission jeopardizing defects. The only proven method for detection of these defects is an independent review of the design details by an impartial, objective, competent peer in the appropriate technical field.
The review process uses a closed-loop system that identifies each design defect, enters it into a tracking system, and requires resolution by either a design change or a program waiver. The process differentiates between analysis omissions and defects or design deficiencies. Analysis deficiencies are also tracked to assure timely updates, which may identify additional design deficiencies and serve as an accurate historical record of the design activity.
Emphasize systems engineering design analysis and rely less on predictions.
Focus on maintainability, especially diagnostics, and provide sufficient resources to mature the diagnostic capability. Effective diagnostics reduce maintenance time and increase system availability. Maintainability demonstrations effectively support maturing the diagnostics, verifying accessibility, providing data to calculate remove and replace times, and confirm the degree of technical skill and adequacy of technical documentation required to perform maintenance. As every failure provides the opportunity to improve reliability, it also provides the opportunity to consider maintainability characteristics.
Link design testing and reliability testing. Every test should also be a reliability test. Early testing often focuses on performance of the system, a subsystem, or a component. Nevertheless, every time a system is tested, reliability data should be collected. Early testing may not be in the stressful operational environment or under realistic conditions. However, when a failure occurs, consider that particular failure mode explicitly. Consider every failure an opportunity for better system understanding, characterization, and ultimately for system improvement. Early in the development process, failure mode removal is almost always easier and less costly than later in the development life cycle. Development must deal with every failure mode, not just those that appear in specially designed reliability tests. For complex systems, it is possible that the demonstrated reliability at the end of the final design phase may still fall short of the RAM design specifications.
A target minimum value of the initial reliability, to be achieved by the end of development, should be established during the pre-acquisition. In order to conform to the stated purpose of Defense Acquisition, the target minimum value should represent a measurable improvement to mission capability and operational support at a fair and reasonable price.
Manage the Failure mode Mitigation Process. A closed loop process deals with failure modes when they are found. Every failure mode, both potential modes which surface during design analysis as well as those identified during performance or other tests, should go through a process to determine how to deal with it. It is important to assess the risk to mission success that the problem poses. Experts who are familiar with similar systems or the operational environment may be able to identify potential failure modes and resolutions as early as the system concept model.
Use Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) to identify failure modes and potential problem areas affecting reliability and safety. The FMEA provides a structured process for addressing and mitigating failure modes. Experience has shown that t is easy to be overly optimistic about the effectiveness of failure mode mitigation. Fix actions are rarely 100 percent effective. Methods for reliability growth are addresses in Chapter 4. The FMEA should be a living document during the development of hardware design. The primary benefit of the FMEA is the early identification of all critical and catastrophic subsystem or system failure modes so they can be eliminated or minimized through design early in development.
If the system does not achieve good RAM, mission performance and life cycle cost are at risk. Assess the Risks and Operational Impacts Before Trading RAM for Cost, Schedule, or Other Requirements. End-to-end modeling of the system life cycle helps to evaluate the impact of changes in RAM. A model of the logistics support concept quantifies the implications of RAM levels on the elements and costs of support over the long term. The pressures of budget or schedule can cause program managers and contractors to consider reducing or eliminating RAM activities. An objective analysis of risk and impact should be made. In particular, any potential negative impact on the system's ability to provide measurable increases to mission capability or operational support should be weighed against any potential short-term savings.
Unless a programmatic, systems engineering and total life-cycle perspective is taken in making such decisions, the net result can be decreased mission performance and increased costs over the long term.
Address RAM considerations in pre-systems acquisition technology development activities. RAM personnel assist in the evaluation of technological capabilities and assess the risk and cost impacts on achieving RAM needs. Modeling the logistics support program helps quantify the RAM impacts on the size and cost of the life cycle support program and indicate where technology development, specifically for reliability and maintainability, is needed to meet acquisition objectives.
Avoid delaying corrective actions. Estimates of reliability
in the presence of delayed corrective actions tend to over estimate reliability significantly. Provide meaningful oversight in executing the contract. The best practice in executing oversight responsibility is based on four principles.
Assess RAM in each phase of development. In early phases the reliability allocation among components is important and its realism and empirical basis must be reviewed carefully. The design of the support system must be checked to ensure it is consistent with known operational constraints.
Find deficiencies as early as possible. These deficiencies can be in any of three areas: technology and its application in the design, the operational concept, and the support concept. Untested technologies should be tested in the stressful operational environment. Logistics drivers such as high failure rate modules, inaccurate fault diagnostics, and mismatches between required maintenance skills and the actual planned maintenance workforce need to be identified as early as possible. The government has special knowledge of the operational environment and the realities of the planned maintenance workforce.
Coordinate and integrate RAM testing and evaluation across all phases. The context for evaluation is always the performance in the operational environment and expressed in operational terms. Early RAM consideration might be based, in part, on expert opinion, or modeling of the system. Later, real test data comes in and the evaluation should be modified to reflect the new information. Areas of uncertainty are areas of risk. Ways to reduce the uncertainty need to be devised as appropriate. Tests of components in stressful operational environments may be appropriate. Many of these actions will require government participation. For example, carrying a proposed sensor package on a surrogate vehicle that simulates the vibration and thermal environment may be appropriate. Another example pertains to new avionics design for an existing airframe: experience has shown that measuring the actual environment (temperature, vibration, power stability, gforces) in an aircraft avionics location is much effective for achieving RAM than relying on the environmental design specifications of the aircraft. Only by staying informed on the reliability aspects of engineering can the government contribute to the success of the product.
The Program Manager initiates four RAM management processes during step 2: the RAM Program Plan, the Data Collection, Analysis and Corrective Action System (DCACAS), the RAM case, and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). These processes continue through the life cycle. All are addressed in more detail in later chapters.
STEP 3: PRODUCE RELIABLE AND MAINTAINABLE PRODUCTS
The purpose of the production and deployment phase of acquisition is to achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs. There are two major parts of this phase: Lowrate initial production (LRIP), and Full-Rate Production and Deployment. Before beginning this phase, the user operational capability is updated. The LRIP effort completes the manufacturing development process and generates the units for Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). The IOT&E provides information on how well the system meets user needs including RAM.
Full-Rate Production and Deployment provide the systems, supporting materiel and services to the users. Finally users attain Initial Operational Capability (IOC).
In step 3, testing and quality assurance are the principal RAM activities. In addition, four RAM processes initiated during earlier steps continue and build on prior work. The four processes are the RAM Program Plan; the Data Collection, Analysis and Corrective Action System (DCACAS); the RAM case, and appropriate portions of the TEMP.
Testing
Determine if the system has a satisfactory level of reliability, availability, and maintainability. The purpose of test and evaluation is learning.
Though operational assessments are conducted through steps 1 and 2, LRIP is normally the first opportunity for dedicated operational tests, using production representative units, operationally representative support systems (including peculiar support systems), representative support personnel, and an operational realistic environment. The final judgment will require that the system "satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission capability and operational support in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable price." This is also the opportunity to verify that fixes from previous phases have been developed, incorporated, and correct the R&M problems without introducing new ones. There is normally not enough time or test units during OT&E to demonstrate achievement of high reliability with high confidence so all relevant R&M data should be exploited for possible use in the overall evaluation.
Quality Assurance
A primary RAM concern during manufacturing is to prevent degradation of the inherent reliability, availability, and maintainability designed into the system during the design phase. The Quality and Product Assurance activities work closely with the RAM development team to assure a full understanding of the impact of the manufacturing processes on end item RAM and to develop value added manufacturing processes that assure the integrity of the product. A stable base of certified vendors and appropriate component acceptance testing is essential.
Involvement of RAM engineering in the review/approval loop for the selection of parts and materials, manufacturing processes and procedures, and assembly procedures further ensures that RAM concerns are addressed. {NASA STD 8729.1}. During the transition from development to production there is often significant pressure to redesign for the purpose of saving costs. Including the RAM team in the review process can eliminate changes that compromise achieving RAM performance.
Achieving Initial Operational Capability
During the second part of this phase (full-rate production and deployment), units are receiving trained manpower, systems, equipment, and support; and they are working toward achieving initial operational capability and the required readiness (operational availability) and sustainability levels. There are many opportunities during this transition for RAMrelated problems to arise, such as inadequate maintenance
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training, unanticipated failure modes, and differences in the operational environment or use profile from that anticipated during design. The RAM team should anticipate this opportunity, monitor this transition, and identify resources to rapidly assess and resolve problems that may arise. Timely identification of RAM design problems during this transition can expedite the development and incorporation of fixes into the production process for remaining units.
STEP 4: MONITOR FIELD EXPERIENCE
Ensure that the needed levels of RAM are sustained during the life of the system, since O&S costs are typically more than half of the LCC. Reliability and maintainability drive the elements of support and the costs of support through the life cycle. The elements of support generally include maintenance at all levels; manpower and personnel to operate and support the system; supply support; support equipment and tools; technical data; training and training support; computer resource support; facilities; and packaging, handling, storage and transportation. Three performance measurements provide overall indications of field experience: mission success rates, operational availability (readiness), and operations and support costs. However, in themselves, they do not necessarily indicate the specific cause of problems. A robust data collection and analysis program, such as a continuation of the DCACAS from earlier steps, will help identify and prioritize specific R and M problems for resolution.
RAM Capabilities Mature over the Operational Life
There are several effective techniques for projecting (and sustaining) the reliability, durability, and maintainability of systems. The "lead-the-fleet" concept often is used for aircraft and ground vehicles. A few systems are used at a much higher usage rate than the fleet average and closely monitored to anticipate and correct the kinds of failures that may develop as fleets age. Other forms of accelerated testing of early articles can identify and correct failure modes early in the life cycle. A reliability-centered maintenance approach and prognostics provide opportunities to sustain and improve mission reliability and unscheduled maintenance.
Sustaining RAM and Trending
To support and sustain RAM capabilities, the collection, analysis, and maintenance of data continues into the operational environment with sufficient detail and visibility to identify RAM performance problems as they begin to emerge. Often, normal Service data collection systems are inadequate to provide the needed RAM detail; and special or augmentation data collection programs are developed and fielded along with the system. These data collection efforts take full advantage of embedded instrumentation, diagnostics, and unique identification (UID) of items. Senior Management's Role.
The Defense Acquisition Executive has the responsibility for supervising the Defense Acquisition System. The Milestone Decision Authority is the designated individual with overall responsibility for a program including advancement to the next phase. The Program Manager is the designated individual with responsibility for development, production, and sustainment to meet the user's operational needs. These senior managers assure that programs achieve the needed levels of RAM by ensuring that:
• Realistic user needs are identified • User needs are properly translated and incentives are placed in contracts • Contractual requirements are satisfied • User needs are demonstrated in OT&E Execution of an acquisition program is the responsibility of the Program Manager. However, senior management plays an essential role in providing guidance and support to ensure that long-term goals are not compromised because of the short-term pressures of schedule and cost. By encouraging careful attention to RAM from the beginning, management can reduce the risks of failing to "satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission capability and operational support in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable price."
The Guide provides questions pertaining to RAM to help senior managers influence the achievement of the RAM capabilities the user needs. The questions are based on the four key steps in Figure 1-3 .
Step 1 questions help determine if the user needs and constraints are well understood: Is there an appropriate, relevant, well-justified RAM rationale? Will the planned RAM provide a measurable improvement? Do the RAM design specifications reflect the rationale and the needed improvement?
Step 2 questions help determine if the program will design and redesign effectively for RAM: How is RAM addressed in the contract? What does the reliability program look like? Is the RAM testing documented in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan?
Step 3 questions help determine if manufacturing will yield reliable products: Is the subcontractor base stable? What are the contract incentives to high quality manufacture?
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